The Impact of Trade Liberalization on Tax Structure in Developing Countries  by Karimi, Mohammad et al.
 Procedia Economics and Finance  36 ( 2016 )  274 – 282 
2212-5671 © 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Peer-review under responsibility of SCIJOUR-Scientifi c Journals Publisher
doi: 10.1016/S2212-5671(16)30038-7 
ScienceDirect
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
1st International Conference on Applied Economics and Business, ICAEB 2015 
The Impact of Trade Liberalization on Tax Structure in Developing 
Countries 
Mohammad Karimia,*, Shivee Ranjanee Kaliappana, Normaz Wana Ismaila, Hanny Zurina 
Hamzaha 
aFaculty of Economic and Management, Universiti Putra Malaysia, 43400, Selangor, Malaysia 
Abstract 
In this paper, we investigate the impact of trade liberalization on tax structure in a panel 97 developing countries for the period 
1993-2012. Our empirical results, based on the fixed-effect estimator, reveal that trade liberalization in the form of trade 
openness did not seem to have a strong impact on major tax sources of developing countries. Instead, trade liberalization in the 
form of tariff reduction seems to have a contribution to tax structure in these countries. 
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1. Introduction 
In the last three decades, there has been a considerable shift towards more liberal trade regimes by many 
developing countries as part of the recommended policy for lending programs of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) and World Bank rules (Jones, Morrissey, & Nelson, 2011). It is widely acknowledged that there are 
substantial gains from trade that result from trade liberalization, but when fiscal revenue is accounted for, it is not 
clear what the net welfare effect will be. 
The widespread trade reforms in the mid-1980s provide an excellent natural experiment to analyze tax structure 
changes. These events indeed coincided with significant changes in the tax structures of countries. For example, 
Tosun (2005) showed that there was a statistically and economically significant move from international trade taxes 
to domestic taxes on goods and services in non-OECD countries from the mid-1980s. Michael et al. (1993), 
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Hatzipanayotou et al. (1994) and Keen and Ligthart (2002) provided a rationale by arguing that replacement of 
tariffs with domestic consumption taxes improves welfare and increases revenues. Tosun (2005) argued that, unlike 
other non-OECD countries, the MENA countries did not increase their reliance on domestic consumption taxes in 
response to trade liberalization. 
    While the tax structures of industrialized nations are similar to a certain extent, developing countries’ tax 
structures vary extensively (Tanzi, 1992; Zee, 1996; Tanzi and Zee, 2000). The fare of revenue impact of trade 
liberalization seems to be considerable in developing countries because for most of them the share of trade tax in 
total tax revenue is high. In this regards, trade liberalization may possibly lead to changes in the tax structure. It 
might reduce current trade tax revenue but also lead to a future enhance in domestic taxes. In most developing 
countries, the major problem of the fiscal consequences of trade liberalization is how to fit the revenue 
compensation into revenue loss from liberalization. For this reason countries must try to implement a domestic tax 
reform with trade liberalization which is associated with broad issues of economic policy, tax administration, and 
tax structure design. The most important and interesting point is to see how tax structure of developing countries 
changed in response to trade liberalization in order to make the whole tax structure desirable, administratively 
practicable, and politically feasible. This paper provides an empirical examination of how tax structures of 
developing countries changed in response to extensive trade liberalization in recent decades.  
    The paper is structured as follows. The next section explains the methodology and highlights the data. Section 3 
reports the empirical results and their interpretation. Discussion and concluding remarks are presented in section 4. 
2. Methodology and data 
2.1. Empirical model 
 In order to account for the effects of trade liberalization on tax structure this study employs the basic approach 
from Tosun (2005), with some modifications. The empirical analysis uses seven major components of total tax 
revenue based on Government Finance Statistics (GFS) database. Accordingly, total tax revenue (TT) is defined as:  
OTITT+DGST+PRT+PAT+ST+IT+= TT   (1) 
Where, where, IT is income, profits and capital gains taxes, ST is social security contributions from both the 
employees and the employers, PAT is payroll taxes, PRT is property taxes, DGST is domestic taxes on goods and 
services, ITT is international trade taxes and OT is all other (residual) taxes. Accordingly, tax shares are defined as 
the ratio of each tax on the right-hand side of the equation (1) to total tax revenue on the left-hand side of equation 
(1). This indicates that  
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Tax structure changes can be examined by using each of the seven tax shares in equation (2) as dependent 
variables in the following regression equations. Since the tax shares always sum to one, across the revenue share 
equations, the value of the coefficients of the explanatory variables would also sum to zero; if a variable leads to an 
increase in the relative reliance on one tax source, it must also lead to the reduction in the reliance on some other 
source. Analogously, the constant terms coefficients in every equation must sum to 100 percent or one. Since each 
component of the tax system in every country is part of an optimal political strategy chosen by a government, the 
equations constitute a system of seemingly unrelated regressions. Efficient estimation of this seemingly unrelated 
system may be, and is, conducted by using exactly the same set of explanatory variables in each equation (Kenny 
and Winer, 2006). The following specification is used to run regressions with tax shares as dependent variables to 
show effect of trade liberalization on tax structure: 
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Where, where ܶܽݔ݄ܵܽݎ݁௝  is share of jth tax type in total tax (in percent). ܮܫܤ is index of trade liberalization that 
we use trade openness and applied tariff rate as indexes of trade liberalization. ܩܱ ௧ܸିଵis lagged of government 
expenditure as share GDP, ܮܩܦܲ is real GDP per capita in natural logarithm, ܱܲܲ͸ͷ is share of population aged 65 
and above in total population, ܮܱܲܲܦ is population density in natural logarithm, services added value as share of 
GDP, ܷܴܤ is urban population ratio, ܣܩܴܫ is agriculture value added as share of GDP, ܨܷܧܮ is share of fuel export 
to GDP, ܥܱܴis CPI corruption index, ܧܦܷ is secondary school enrollment, ݑ௜ is a country fixed effect, and ߝ௜௧ is an 
unobserved random error term. By applying fixed effect regression model, we try to estimate the coefficients of 
above equation to examine the impact of trade liberalization on tax structure. 
2.2. Data  
In this study, the focus is on developing countries over the period 1993–2012. The 97 developing countries, listed 
on Table 1, are selected based on availability of data. The tax revenues are collected from Government Finance 
Statistics (GFS). Outside the OECD countries, reliable data on tax revenues are not readily available. The GFS 
produced by the IMF is the most complete source, but suffers from a number of difficulties: the series has many 
gaps, including missing variables or simply no entries for a particular country. Tariff rate are collected from 
UNCTAD and WTO databases. The index of corruption used in this study is corruption perception index (CPI) 
provided by Transparency International. All other variables used in this study are collected from the World Bank, 
World Development Indicators (WDI). 
    Table 1. Sample countries classification by income level. 
low income and lower-middle income countries upper-middle income and high income countries 
Afghanistan Liberia Albania Kuwait 
Armenia, Republic of Mali Algeria Lebanon 
Bangladesh Moldova Angola Macao 
Benin Mongolia Argentina Malaysia 
Bhutan Morocco Bahamas, The Maldives 
Bolivia Myanmar Bahrain Mauritius 
Burkina Faso Nepal Barbados Mexico 
Cabo Verde Nicaragua Belarus Namibia 
Cambodia Pakistan Belize Oman 
Congo, Republic of Papua New Guinea Bosnia and Herzegovina Peru 
Cote d'Ivoire Paraguay Botswana Qatar 
Egypt Philippines Brazil Romania 
El Salvador Sao Tome  Bulgaria Russian Federation 
Ethiopia Senegal Chile Seychelles 
Gambia, The Sierra Leone China, P.R. Singapore 
Georgia Sri Lanka Colombia South Africa 
Guatemala Swaziland Costa Rica St. Kitts and Nevis 
Honduras Syria Dominica St. Lucia 
India Tajikistan Dominican Republic St. Vincent  
Indonesia Togo Grenada Suriname 
Kenya Uganda  Hong Kong Thailand 
Kyrgyz Republic Yemen Iran Tunisia 
Lao People's  Zambia Jamaica Turkey 
Lesotho  Jordan Uruguay 
  Kazakhstan Venezuela 
      Source: World Development Indicators (WDI) 2014. 
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3. Empirical results 
To examine the relationship between trade liberalization and tax structure in developing countries, fixed effects 
regression framework is performed. The analysis seeks to estimate the impact of trade liberalization on tax structure 
by using different indexes of trade liberalization.  At first, we estimate the impact of trade openness, as an index of 
trade liberalization, on tax structure. Then, we repeat the procedure for other different index of trade liberalization. 
Before proceeding to empirical results, we conduct series of econometric tests for fixed-effects specification. At 
first, a simple F-test for the joint significance of dummies that form the countries fixed-effects is used. For all 14 
regression, the null hypothesis of F-tests, which states common intercept for all countries, are rejected. After that, the 
Hausman test is conducted to choose between the random-effect or fixed-effect models. This test tests the null 
hypothesis of non-existence of correlation between unobservable individual effects and the tax shares determinants, 
against the alternative hypothesis of existence of correlation. If the null hypothesis is not rejected we can conclude 
that correlation is not relevant and therefore a panel model of random-effects being the most correct way of carrying 
out the analysis of the relationship between tax shares and their determinants. On the contrary, if the null hypothesis 
is rejected we can conclude that correlation is relevant and therefore a panel model of fixed effects being the most 
appropriate way to carrying out the analysis. The Hausman tests results indicate that in most regressions (13 out of 
14) the null hypothesis of random-effects is rejected. Only in one regression the random-effects is appropriate. 
However, the fixed-effects model will be unbiased even when random-effect estimator is suitable.* Thus the fixed-
effects model is applied as base model to estimate the regressions.    
After obtaining an appropriate model, then we perform various diagnostic checks. Heteroskedasticity is a 
potential problem in any cross-sectional units of panel that includes countries with substantial variation in population 
and per capita income. Indeed, the panel nature of data is potential for serial correlation problem. Serial correlation is 
a problem in macro panels with long time series (over 20-30 years). It causes the standard errors of the coefficients 
to be smaller than they actually are and higher R-squared. Tests for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation are 
conducted by Modified Wald test and Wooldridge-Lagrange Multiplier test. Based on results of these tests the null 
hypothesizes of no homoskedasticity (or constant variance) and no serial correlations are rejected and indicate a 
problem of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. Using Huber-White/Sandwich robust standard errors, the 
resulting standard errors are completely robust to any kind of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. Indeed, 
diagnostic tests suggest that our results do not suffer from multicollinearity. 
Fixed effects regressions explaining the share of seven tax sources are reported in Table 2 and 3. As argued by 
Kenny and Winer (2006), since governments determine each component of tax system as a part of an optimal 
political strategy, the regressions represent a seemingly unrelated regression system. Considering this seemingly 
unrelated system, by comparing the estimated coefficients of trade liberalization variable in seven regressions we 
can conclude the impact of trade liberalization on tax structure.  
Table 2 describes the effect of trade liberalization where it is measured as the share of external trade in GDP 
(trade openness) and other control variables on seven components of tax revenues. With considering the R-square, 
all regressions fit the data reasonably well. Estimated coefficients of independent variables across the regressions 
sum to zero and for constant terms sum to 100 that are theoretically correct values as discussed earlier. The 
estimated coefficients for trade openness are not statistically significant in all regressions. The sign for income taxes, 
property taxes, property taxes, and international trade taxes are positive and for social security contribution, 
domestic taxes on goods and services and other taxes are negative. Therefore, the results indicate the countries that 
become more open tended to increase income taxes, property taxes, property taxes, and international trade taxes and 
decrease social security contribution, domestic taxes on goods and services and other taxes. For instance, an increase 






278   Mohammad Karimi et al. /  Procedia Economics and Finance  36 ( 2016 )  274 – 282 
Table 2. Results of fixed-effects regressions, impact of trade openness on tax structure 
Source: Author’s own calculation. Notes: the robust t-statistics are in parentheses, except for Hausman test that the p-values are in parentheses.              
* indicates significance at 10% level, ** significance at 5% and *** significance at 1% level. Full set of country dummies are included in the 
regression and jointly significant but are shown in the table due to limited space. Sample period from 1993 to 2012. 
Between the taxes, the largest impacts were on income, profits and capital gains taxes and domestic taxes on 
goods and services with coefficient of 0.029 and -0.021, respectively. However, it seems that none of major tax 
revenue sources in developing countries were significantly impacted by trade openness since all openness 
coefficients in all regressions is small and insignificant.  
Table 3 shows impact of applied tariff rates, as second index of trade liberalization, on seven categories of tax 
revenues (or tax structure) in developing countries. Using the second index, we find nearly a different pattern of 
results in contrast to Table 2. The estimated coefficient for tariff rate (trade liberalization) in regressions with 
income, profit and capital gains taxes, domestic taxes on goods and services and international trade taxes are 
statistically significant. The sign for the income taxes and domestic taxes on goods and services is negative and for 


























Other tax (OT) 
Trade liberalization 
(Trade openness) 
0.029 -0.015 0.005 0.003 -0.021 0.002 -0.002 
(1.41)      (-1.49) (1.22) (0.40) (-0.55) (0.05) (-0.21) 
Government 
expenditure (lagged) 
0.372*** 0.115 0.000 -0.017 -0.216 -0.279 0.025 
(2.66)      (1.25) (0.00) (-0.70) (-1.12) (-1.64) (0.45) 
Real GDP per capita 
(logarithm) 
7.920** -0.028 -1.249 -2.133** -0.072 -3.347 -1.088 
(2.22)      (-0.03) (-1.24) (-2.40) (-0.02) (-0.93) (-0.69) 
Population aged 65 and 
above 
-0.718 1.488** -0.065 0.211 3.150** -3.837*** -0.229 
(-0.79)      (2.19) (-0.46) (0.87) (2.39) (-3.31) (-0.45) 
Population density 
(logarithm) 
11.974* -0.784 -0.384 -0.561 3.753 -13.247 -0.752 
(1.83)      (-0.43) (-0.26) (-0.48) (0.51) (-1.23) (-0.29) 
Urban population  0.004 -0.051 -0.024 0.083* 0.135 -0.246 0.099 
(0.02) (-0.61) (-0.42) (1.71) (0.40) (-0.80) (1.29) 
Agriculture, value 
added 
0.080 0.035 0.021 0.001 0.046 -0.097 -0.085 
(0.71)      (0.82) (1.02) (0.05) (0.35) (-.99) (-1.22) 
Fuel exports  -0.015     0.013 -0.027 0.011 -0.129** 0.161** -0.013 
(-0.23)      (0.79) (-1.60) (0.53) (-2.07) (2.04) (-0.32) 
Corruption 0.387     0.321 0.283* -0.063 0.589 -1.112 -0.405 
(0.43)      (1.08) (1.74) (-0.28) (0.63) (-1.43) (-1.26) 
Education -0.046 0.019 0.042* 0.025 -0.078 0.029 0.008 
(-0.68)      (0.40) (1.67) (1.64) (-0.88) (0.32) (0.28) 
Constant -86.388*** -4.240 9.292 13.737** 10.617 144.580*** 12.392 
 (-3.11) (-0.58) (0.113) (2.58) (0.30) (3.42) (1.20) 
Hausman test 95.79*** 30.43*** 38.90*** 32.79*** 30.73*** 120.67*** 8.72 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.56) 
Observation 1552 1552 1552 1552 1552 1552 1552 
N 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 
R-squared  0.82 0.64 0.62 0.76 0.82 0.86 0.67 
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therefore developing countries that become more open tend to increase its share of income taxes and domestic taxes 
of goods and services and in contrast, decrease its share of international trade taxes. It implies the trade liberalization 
in the form of tariff reduction seems to cause a move from international trade to domestic taxes on goods and 
services and income taxes as expected. For example, estimated coefficient of applied tariff rate in income tax 
regression indicates that one percentage point decrease in applied tariff rate would have resulted to a 0.224 
percentage point increase in income taxes when everything else is kept constant.  
 
Table 3. Results of fixed-effects regressions, impact of tariff rate on tax structure 
Source: Author’s own calculation. Notes: the robust t-statistics are in parentheses, except for Hausman test that the p-values are in parentheses.              
* indicates significance at 10% level, ** significance at 5% and *** significance at 1% level. Full set of country dummies are included in the 
regression and jointly significant but are shown in the table due to limited space. Sample period from 1993 to 2012. 
Between the taxes the largest significantly impacts of trade liberalization are on international trade taxes, 
domestic taxes on goods and services and income taxes, respectively. While, the results indicate that none of social 


























Other tax (OT) 
Trade liberalization 
(applied tariff rate) 
-0.224*** 0.038 0.005 -0.006 -0.262* 0.470*** -0.021 
(3.34)      (1.44) (0.28) (-0.44) (-1.71) (3.50) (-0.46) 
Government 
expenditure (lagged) 
0.379*** 0.114 0.000 -0.017 -0.210 -0.290 0.025 
(2.77)      (1.22) (0.00) (-0.69) (-1.07) (-1.65) (0.54) 
Real GDP per capita 
(logarithm) 
6.804** 0.043 -1.158 -2.140** -2.001 -0.294 -1.251 
(2.03)      (0.04) (-1.12) (-2.42) (-0.47) (-0.09) (-0.74) 
Population aged 65 and 
above 
-0.834 1.457** -0.033 0.217 2.747** -3.290*** -0.265 
(-0.98) (2.16) (-0.24) (0.90) (2.08) (-3.39) (-0.52) 
Population density 
(logarithm) 
9.044 -0.345 -0.290 -0.624 0.013 -6.738 -1.061 
(1.39)      (-0.17) (-0.18) (-0.51) (0.00) (-0.66) (-0.44) 
Urban population  0.013 -0.052 -0.024 0.083* 0.146 -0.265 0.100 
(0.05) (-0.63) (-0.43) (1.71) (0.46) (-0.99) (1.29) 
Agriculture, value 
added 
0.073 0.038 0.020 0.001 0.052 -0.100 -0.084 
(0.70)      (0.93) (0.96) (0.02) (0.38) (-0.99) (-1.21) 
Fuel exports  -0.013     0.013 -0.027 0.011 -0.126** 0.155** -0.013 
(-0.20)      (0.76) (-1.62) (0.54) (-2.00) (2.02) (-0.31) 
Corruption 0.307     0.329 0.288* -0.064 0.465 -0.909 -0.416 
(0.34)      (1.09) (1.76) (-0.29) (0.49) (-1.22) (-1.26) 
Education -0.059 0.023 0.042 0.025 -0.086 0.048 0.007 
(-0.91)      (0.47) (1.63) (1.62) (-0.96) (0.53) (0.27) 
Constant -58.495** -8.595 8.508 14.374** 45.280 83.677** 15.251 
 (-2.09) (-0.95) (1.18) (2.55) (1.29) (2.21) (1.21) 
Hausman test 56.68*** 33.63*** 38.04*** 36.04*** 22.26** 63.34*** 19.38** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.04) 
Observation 1552 1552 1552 1552 1552 1552 1552 
N 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 
R-squared  0.82 0.64 0.62 0.76 0.83 0.87 0.67 
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It is implying the absence of any significant relationship between tariff rates and these four taxes shares. However, 
among these taxes that are not significantly affected the sign of social security contribution and payroll taxes are 
positive and sign of property taxes and other taxes are negative. As expected, in this seemingly unrelated system the 
value of the coefficients of every independent variables sum to zero. 
The coefficients of remaining control variables also reported in Tables 2 and 3. The control variables include the 
The lag of government expenditure, real GDP per capita, population aged 65 and above, population density, urban 
population, agriculture value added, fuel exports, corruption and education. The results presented in Table 2 and 3 
indicate that the estimated coefficients of all control variables, in all three models, are almost similar to each other in 
term of sign and significance.    
The lagged government spending impresses the government size. It is expected, as the government size becomes 
larger, more taxes are collected from each tax source. But the question is: as the governments get larger whether or 
not the share taxes drawn from any sources are changed? As Hettich and Winer (1984) and; Kenny and Winer 
(2006) mentioned, the government size may impact tax mix because change in the government size may changes the 
marginal political cost for each tax source. Our results indicate that in general, as lagged government expenditure 
increase the share of taxes from income and social security contributions and from other taxes raise, and that the 
shares of taxes coming from property taxes and international trade taxes fell although, only the estimated coefficient 
for income tax is statistically significant. 
The size of countries and potential tax base effects are captured by GDP per capita. This is important since our 
sample includes countries in different level of incomes. As the results show, GDP per capita has a significant 
positive impact on income tax shares as expected; this effect is also accompanied by the substitution away from 
several other taxes: international trade taxes, property taxes, payroll taxes, and (weakly) other taxes. This results 
support the finding in prior research, which show a positive impact on income taxes and a negative relationship 
between international trade tax and GDP (see Tosun and Abizadeh, 2005). 
Population aged 65 and above shows the percentage of old-age population and it is used to control for relatively 
weighty reliance on particular taxes. The results confirm the Tosun (2005) view that higher proportion of old-age 
population is associated with increase in social security contribution share. The results also indicate that an increase 
in the ratio of elderly population has a significantly positive impact on domestic taxes on goods and services but a 
significantly negative impact on international trade taxes. 
Kenny and Winer (2006) used population density and urbanization as factors that affect tax bases. Our result 
indicate that population density has a significantly positive impact on the use of income, profits and capital gain 
taxes. Considering the urbanization, it also has a significantly positive impact on property taxes, consistent with 
result of Kenny and Winer (2006). Kau and Robin (1981) considered that collecting the taxes in urban areas may be 
less costly, and also Riezman and Slemrod (1987) argued that the collecting of income taxes and goods and services 
taxes are easier in more densely populated areas. Our results support the arguments that population density and 
urbanization have the predicted positive impact on income and sales taxes and negative impact on trade taxes, 
although most of the coefficients are not significant. Thus, countries may rely more on hard to collect taxes as 
population density and urbanization increase. 
The agriculture value added as a percentage of GDP is expected to have negative sign in income taxes and 
domestic taxes on goods and services, because the economic activities in this sector are more difficult to tax, 
especially in most developing countries, where productions tend to be organized on small scale basis (Castro and 
Camarillo, 2014).   Our results indicate that agricultural value-added don’t have any significant impact on all tax 
shares. However, the sign for most tax shares are in contrary to prior researches. 
Fuel export has been one important source of wealth and government revenue in many developing countries. It is 
expected that countries with high share of fuel exports as percent of total merchandise exports rely more in easy to 
collect taxes, like international trade tax, due to inadequate administrations set-up and limited features. Our result 
confirm this idea as the fuel exports in international trade tax regressions have positive significant coefficients and 
adversely in domestic taxes on goods and services regressions it have negative significant coefficients.  
Institutional quality plays a direct role in the collection of tax revenues in the countries. Developing and less 
developed countries generally have relatively low institutional quality and corrupt governments, causing a problem 
in the improvement of tax collection and administration. These features contribute the use of more trade tax instead 
of income and sales taxes in these countries because, trade taxes are relatively easy to collect and monitor compare 
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to income and consumption base taxes. Our results suggest that countries with higher corruption (lower CPI index) 
rely more on trade taxes and on the opposite side, countries with lower corruption (higher CPI index) rely more on 
income and goods and services taxes. However, the coefficients are not statistically significant. Only for payroll tax 
regressions the coefficients are positively significant, indicates that improvement in the institution quality will rise 
the property taxes.  
Surprisingly, the results for education variable do not meet our expectations. The results suggest that reliance on 
income taxes and domestic taxes on goods and services decrease and countries rely more on social security, payroll, 
property, and trade taxes as educational level increase. However, except property taxes the estimated coefficients of 
other tax shares are not statistically significant. These results are in contrary to Riezman and Slemrod (1987) 
argument and Kenny and Winer (2006) results that the income taxes and goods and services taxes need widespread 
literacy.  
4. Discussion and concluding remarks 
Although many independent variables are included in the model, the discussion focuses on the results concerning 
the effect of trade liberalization on tax structure using different measures of trade liberalization. Applying the fixed 
effect regressions model, at first stage we use trade openness, export plus import divided by GDP, as a proxy of 
trade liberalization. The results indicate that none of the seven tax shares are significantly impacted by the increase 
in trade openness in developing countries in 1993 to 2012 period. While, several authors have investigated the effect 
of trade liberalization on tax structure, the evidence is not consistent. This result doesn’t support the arguments by 
Keen and Ligthart (2002) regarding the welfare enhancement from switching to domestic taxes. From the empirical 
point of view, the results also are not consistent with Tosun (2005) results but it is in line with arguments by Kenny 
and Winer (2006) regarding that countries with more international trade rely more on international trade taxes. 
The impact of trade liberalization on tax structure in the form of reduction of tariff rates differs to in the form of 
trade openness. While trade openness don’t have significant impact on all kind of tax shares in developing countries, 
reduction on tariff rates seem to have a contribution to tax structure in these countries. In conclusion, it should be 
noted that because trade liberalization may apply in many forms, its effects differ greatly in feature of liberalization. 
Trade liberalization in the form of tariff reduction changes the tax composition of developing countries by 
moving away from international trade taxation and compensating the loss of trade taxes by expanding more taxes 
from income and domestic goods and services taxes. The coefficients of applied tariff rate in income, domestic 
goods and services, and international trade taxes are -0.224, -0.262, and 0.470, respectively. It implies that a 
percentage reduction in tariff rates leads to a 0.224 and 0.262 percent increase in share of income taxes and domestic 
taxes in goods and services on total tax, while a percentage reduction in tariff rates is associated with a 0.47 percent 
reduction in international trade tax share.  
The finding provides evidences that trade liberalization in the form of tariff reduction has a significant positive 
effect on domestic consumption taxes in developing countries. These findings support the arguments by 
Hatzipanayotou et al. (1994) and Keen and Ligthart (2002) regarding that replacement of tariffs with domestic 
indirect taxes improves the welfare. From the empirical point of view, the results show some consistency with the 
result of Khattry and Mohan Rao (2002), Tosun (2005), Agbeyegbe et al. (2006), and Aizenman and Jinjarak 
(2009). In conclusion, it should be noted that because trade liberalization may apply in many forms, its effects differ 
greatly in feature of liberalization. The sensitivity of the results to measure of trade liberalization suggest the need 
for careful consideration of the best way to proxy this variable. 
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